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Ozu, Akira; Maeda, Makoto; Komeda, Masao; Furutaka, Kazuyoshi; Toh, Yosuke
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
no abstracts in English
Suda, Kazunori; Shimizu, Ryo; Tazaki, Makiko; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kitade, Yuta
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
Since India's nuclear explosion in 1974, there has been continued discussion on nuclear non-proliferation. At first, to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was established to discuss reprocessing, plutonium handling, and so on. After that, to respond to the threat of proliferation posed by DPRK, the international community desired to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. In recent years, some researchers at universities and national laboratories are studying proliferation resistance from the standpoint of nuclear materials that may be inherently self-protecting. This paper discusses minimization of proliferation risk and future prospects based on alternative measures for reprocessing, plutonium handling, and recycling described in INFCE-WG4.
Tazaki, Makiko; Suda, Kazunori; Shimizu, Ryo; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kitade, Yuta
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
no abstracts in English
Sekine, Megumi; Matsuki, Takuya; Tokoro, Hayate; Tsutagi, Koichi; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Nakamura, Hironobu
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
In a reprocessing facility, it is necessary to develop a detector which is measurable plutonium (Pu) amount in the Pu solution containing the Fission Product (FP) in order to expand the application of Pu monitoring. To investigate 
rays which is applicable for Pu monitoring, Ce:GAGG (Ce: Gd
Al
GaO
) scintillator which can measure a wide range of energy at high dose and has high resolution (Target: High Active Liquid Waste (HALW)) was newly designed and developed in deal with aim for Pu quantitativeness. ray measurement was performed to the HALW in the concrete cell using the detector, and it was confirmed that high energy rays (9.5 MeV) could be measured and high energy rays spectra over 3 MeV without deriving from FP at the first time. In this presentation, detector design, results of ray spectra measurement, applicability evaluation to Pu monitoring and the future plan are presented. This project has been carried out under the support of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of the Japanese government.
Tamai, Hiroshi; Tazaki, Makiko; Kitade, Yuta; Shimizu, Ryo; Suda, Kazunori
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 6 Pages, 2018/04
The United Kingdom, UK, in March 2017, notified the withdrawal from the European Union, EU. Since EURATOM is managed by the same organisation of EU, the withdrawal from EURATOM is considered to be unavoidable. UK has to define the regulation for the measures covered by EURATOM which include the implementing safeguards in the civil UK nuclear facilities and the nuclear cooperation agreements between EURATOM and third nations. UK experts recognise that such re-arrangements within 2-years are very tough hurdle, so that some alternative measures are proposed by industry side. For peaceful nuclear use in Japan, hindrances on the smooth transfers of nuclear materials and equipment between UK are concerned. This paper will discuss the UK withdrawal from EURATOM focused on the UK's correspondence and the potential influence on cooperation with Japan in view of nuclear non-proliferation.
Kitao, Takahiko; Takeuchi, Yoshikatsu; Kimura, Takashi; Kojima, Junji; Shioya, Satoshi; Tasaki, Takashi; Nakamura, Hironobu
Nihon Kaku Busshitsu Kanri Gakkai Dai-38-Kai Nenji Taikai Rombunshu (Internet), 9 Pages, 2018/04
In order to ensure and strengthen nuclear security measures, an active cultivation of nuclear security culture implemented by both entire organization and individual persons is vitally essential. Tokai reprocessing facility has conducted various activities such as case study education and training, yearly posters and patrolling the site by upper-level management that all employees hold a deep rooted belief that there is a credible insider and outsider threat, and that nuclear security is important. These activities are conducted in order to establish the foundation of beliefs and attitudes of effective nuclear security culture based on the IAEA guideline. This report introduces our activities fostering nuclear security culture in Tokai reprocessing facility that the evaluation and the continuous improvement of bidirectional activities by both top-down from multiple management levels and bottom-up from individual employee, and our challenges need to be worked on for the future.
Furutaka, Kazuyoshi; Ozu, Akira; Maeda, Makoto; Komeda, Masao; Toh, Yosuke
no journal, ,
Currently, in collaboration with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has conducted a program to develop non-destructive analysis (NDA) techniques for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. One of the aims of the program is to develop detection methods for highly explosives (HE) in the so-called "dirty bombs" as well as toxic materials in chemical warfare (CW) agents, with prompt -ray analysis technique. In the course of the program, we have constructed an integrated active neutron non-destructive assay system named "Active-N" in which a compact DT neutron source is utilized and which is equipped with a high-purity germanium detector for PGA measurements. To evaluate whether the prompt rays can be detected from the constituent elements of HEs and CWs, using the PGA part of the system, a series of measurements were done. For HE detection, the target element is Nitrogen. For CW detection, the measurements were done for the following elements: Phosphorus, Chlorine, Sulfur, Boron, Silicon, Titanium, and Zinc. In this paper, the results of the measurements will be presented.
Suzuki, Mitsutoshi
no journal, ,
After the publication of the "Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM)" in 2008, there have been a long discussion about the expression of uncertainty between the chemical analysts and safeguards evaluation communities to deepen the mutual understanding. In this presentation, the effect of uncertainty quantification on the near-real-time accountancy evaluation will be discussed.
Miyaji, Noriko; Takada, Akira*; Iwafuchi, Junichi; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Shiba, Tomooki; Okumura, Keisuke; Nagatani, Taketeru; Nauchi, Yasushi*
no journal, ,
Nuclear materials in fuel debris need to be properly managed in order to assure to the international and national communities that no nuclear materials have been diverted. In order to provide this assurance, specific measures appropriate to the characteristics of the fuel debris are required. There is experience at managing fuel debris in similar situations, as it was the case of the partial meltdown at the TMI-2 in the US. The nuclear material in the fuel debris retrieved from the reactor was quantified in order to fulfill domestic law requirements in the US. NDA, DA, and visual observation were applied to the residual fuel in the reactor. On that specific accident, IAEA safeguards were not applied because the USA is a nuclear weapon state and therefore this power plant was not inspected by the IAEA. Nuclear material accounting (NMA)is an important measure to manage nuclear materials for states under IAEA safeguards. In this presentation a report on NMA as a measure to manage fuel debris will be discussed.
Takahashi, Tone; Koizumi, Mitsuo; Rodriguez, D.; Rossi, F.; Takamine, Jun; Seya, Michio; Paradela, C.*; Heyse, J.*; Schillebeeckx, P.*; Pedersen, B.*; et al.
no journal, ,
Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy (DGS) has been developed as one of the non-destructive assay using active neutron for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the collaboration research between Japan Atomic Energy Agency and Joint Research Center of European Commission. The differences of fission-product (FP) yield distributions are depending on the fissile nuclide (e.g. 
U, 
Pu, and 
Pu). Therefore, ratios of fissile materials can be deduced by analyzing spectra of delayed gamma-rays which are emitted from radioactive decays of unstable FPs produced by irradiating neutrons and causing induced fission. We are developing an analytical method focusing on high energy delayed gamma-rays above 3 MeV from FPs with relatively short half-life (seconds to several minutes). The demonstration plan of DGS will be presented.
Koizumi, Mitsuo; Seya, Michio; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Hori, Masato; Naoi, Yosuke
no journal, ,
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is developing nuclear detection and measurement techniques under the support of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The project under the subsidy of "promotion and strengthening of nuclear security and the other issues" includes the sub-projects of "Demonstration experiment of nuclear resonance fluorescence non-destructive assay (NDA)" for detection heavily shielded nuclear material, "Development of active neutron NDA techniques" for analysis of a low and high radioactive objects containing nuclear materials and the other elements with a DT neutron source, and "Development of an advance plutonium monitoring system" for monitoring highly radioactive nuclear materials. This presentation overviews these projects.
Seya, Michio
no journal, ,
This presentation explains at first the position of the large scale plutonium handling facility in the nuclear fuel cycle and the situation of technology development of non-destructive assay (NDA) as basis of unattended safeguards verification of nuclear materials handled in the cycle. Then the presentation explains the summary of the development of the unattended safeguards verification systems at PFPF of JAEA and IAEA's request for "SBD (Safeguards by Design) to member states as an end. Then it explains that SBD for new types of facility is included in "IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2023 (STR-375)". Also it explains about the direction of the technology development of NDA for high radiation nuclear material (HRNM), "nuclear material with fission products and minor actinides, need to go to the development "active neutron NDA technologies".
Kitade, Yuta
no journal, ,
FMCT should be "non-discriminatory", "multilateral," and "internationally and effectively verifiable. The GGE report published in 2015 stated that "There was strong support for a non-discriminatory verification regime, under which all States parties are subject to the same obligations". In other words, a single verification objective among states parties is required for FMCT. Therefore, application of safeguards of the same standard is required irrespective of whether or not the state is nuclear-armed. Intrusive on-site verification activities, such as complementary access under the IAEA Model Additional Protocol, should be accepted for nuclear-armed states to achieve the relevant FMCT goals for the purpose of preventing secret and undeclared production of weapon-grade fissile material. From the viewpoint of "non-discrimination", this paper considers whether intrusive inspections should also be required in non-nuclear-weapon states which do not accept such obligations, and also considers problematic issues on this case.
Shimizu, Ryo; Suda, Kazunori; Tazaki, Makiko; Tamai, Hiroshi; Kitade, Yuta
no journal, ,
In order to deal with Iran's and DPRK's ambitious nuclear programs, the international community has made various efforts, including negotiation within a multilateral framework and UNSC's economic sanctions. As to Iran's nuclear program, EU3+3 successfully reached a JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in July 2015 by lifting sanctions as well as limiting Iran's nuclear capacity. On the other hand, the international community has not been successful so far in discouraging DPRK from conducting nuclear and missile tests. Six-Party Talks is still suspended. In this report, various aspects of Iran's and DPRK's nuclear programs are to be precisely delineated, and then discussed in order to develop possible measures against DPRK's nuclear program, together with potential effects on the countries concerned when implementing such measures.